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Unless otherwise indicated, all years are federal fiscal years, which run from October 1 to 
September 30 and are designated by the calendar year in which they end. 
Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
As referred to in this report, the Affordable Care Act comprises the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (Public Law 111-148); the health care provisions of the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152); and the effects of subsequent judicial 
decisions, administrative actions, and certain statutory changes. Some statutory changes that 
have been made subsequently have superseded provisions of the ACA and thus affect the 
estimated impact of repealing the ACA. 
Estimates of insurance coverage reflect average enrollment over the course of a calendar year 
and include spouses and dependents covered under family policies; people with multiple 
sources of coverage are assigned to a single category on the basis of their primary coverage. 
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CBO
Budgetary and Economic Effects of 
Repealing the Affordable Care Act
Summary
Over the past several years, a number of proposals have 
been advanced for repealing the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), which became law in March 2010. In this report, 
the Congressional Budget Office and the staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) analyze the main budget-
ary and economic consequences that would arise from 
repealing that law. 
To conduct the analysis, CBO and JCT first considered 
the effects of the ACA’s repeal on health insurance cover-
age and on the federal budget over the next 10 years, 
holding gross domestic product (GDP) and other macro-
economic variables (such as interest rates) constant—
assumptions that underlie most cost estimates used in the 
Congressional budget process. The agencies then exam-
ined the macroeconomic effects of repealing the ACA and 
estimated the consequences of the resulting feedback for 
the federal budget over the next decade (involving changes 
in tax revenue, for example, that stem from changes in 
GDP). Finally, CBO and JCT considered the budgetary 
and economic effects of repealing the ACA for the period 
beyond 2025. 
As has been the practice for past analyses of the ACA, 
CBO and JCT estimated the budgetary implications of a 
repeal in two broad categories: the effects of repealing the 
act’s provisions concerning insurance coverage—includ-
ing subsidies provided through the insurance exchanges, 
added costs for Medicaid, revenues from certain penalties 
and taxes, and related effects—and the effects of repealing 
other provisions of the act, which would mostly be 
related to Medicare spending and tax revenues. For the 
purposes of this analysis, CBO and JCT assumed that a 
repeal would take effect on January 1, 2016, and would 
not change federal law retroactively. As discussed below, 
all of the resulting estimates are subject to substantial 
uncertainty. 
What Would Be the Major Effects of 
Repealing the ACA? 
CBO and JCT estimate that repealing the ACA would 
have several major effects, relative to the projections 
under current law: 
 Including the budgetary effects of macroeconomic 
feedback, repealing the ACA would increase federal 
budget deficits by $137 billion over the 2016–2025 
period (see Table 1). That estimate takes into account 
the proposal’s impact on federal revenues and direct 
(or mandatory) spending, incorporating the net effects 
of two components: 
• Excluding the effects of macroeconomic 
feedback—as has been done for previous estimates 
related to the ACA (and most other CBO cost 
estimates)—CBO and JCT estimate that federal 
deficits would increase by $353 billion over the 
2016–2025 period if the ACA was repealed.  
• Repeal of the ACA would raise economic output, 
mainly by boosting the supply of labor; the 
resulting increase in GDP is projected to average 
about 0.7 percent over the 2021–2025 period. 
Alone, those effects would reduce federal deficits 
by $216 billion over the 2016–2025 period, CBO 
and JCT estimate, mostly because of increased 
federal revenues. 
 For many reasons, the budgetary and economic effects 
of repealing the ACA could differ substantially in 
either direction from the central estimates presented in 
this report. The uncertainty is sufficiently great that 
repealing the ACA could reduce deficits over the 
2016–2025 period—or could increase deficits by a 
substantially larger margin than the agencies have 
estimated. However, CBO and JCT’s best estimate is 
that repealing the ACA would increase federal budget 
deficits by $137 billion over that 10-year period. 
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Table 1.
Summary of Estimated Effects on Direct Spending and Revenues of Repealing the 
Affordable Care Act
Billions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: Repealing the Affordable Care Act (ACA) would reduce the amounts of future appropriations needed by the agencies responsible for 
implementing the ACA and would eliminate the authorizations of certain other appropriations; such effects on discretionary spending 
are not included in this table and would depend on future legislative action. In addition, the results shown here do not include effects 
on discretionary spending that stem from macroeconomic feedback, which are estimated to be minimal. 
Direct spending is the budget authority provided by laws other than appropriations acts and the outlays that result from that budget 
authority. 
* = between zero and -$0.5 billion.
a. Positive numbers indicate increases in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate reductions in the deficit. 
 Repealing the ACA would cause federal budget deficits 
to increase by growing amounts after 2025, whether or 
not the budgetary effects of macroeconomic feedback 
are included. That would occur because the net savings 
attributable to a repeal of the law’s insurance coverage 
provisions would grow more slowly than would the 
estimated costs of repealing the ACA’s other 
provisions—in particular, those provisions that reduce 
updates to Medicare’s payments. The estimated effects 
on deficits of repealing the ACA are so large in the 
decade after 2025 as to make it unlikely that a repeal 
would reduce deficits during that period, even after 
considering the great uncertainties involved.
 Repealing the ACA also would affect the number of 
people with health insurance and their sources of 
coverage. CBO and JCT estimate that the number of 
nonelderly people who are uninsured would increase by 
about 19 million in 2016; by 22 million or 23 million 
in 2017, 2018, and 2019; and by about 24 million in 
all subsequent years through 2025, compared with 
the number who are projected to be uninsured under 
the ACA. In most of those years, the number of people 
with employment-based coverage would increase by 
about 8 million, and the number with coverage 
purchased individually or obtained through Medicaid 
would decrease by between 30 million and 32 million.  
How Would a Repeal Affect the Budget and the 
Economy Over the Next 10 Years? 
CBO and JCT’s estimate that repealing the ACA would 
increase deficits by $353 billion over the 2016–2025 
period, excluding the budgetary impact of macro-
economic feedback, has four major components (see 
Table 2):
 An end to the ACA’s subsidies for health insurance 
coverage would generate gross savings for the 
government of $1,658 billion over the 2016–2025 
period, CBO and JCT estimate. Those savings would 
stem primarily from eliminating federal subsidies for 
insurance purchased through exchanges and from 
reducing outlays for Medicaid. 







Effects on Outlays -71 -107 -106 -100 -93 -88 -77 -71 -65 -43 -477 -821
Effects on Revenues -66 -79 -99 -107 -115 -123 -132 -142 -152 -161 -466 -1,174
Effects on the Deficita -5 -28 -7 7 21 35 55 70 87 118 -12 353
Effects on Outlays * -2 -3 -2 -1 1 2 4 5 6 -8 9
Effects on Revenues 3 11 21 26 27 27 28 28 27 26 88 225
Effects on the Deficita -4 -13 -24 -29 -28 -26 -26 -24 -23 -20 -97 -216
Effects on Outlays -71 -109 -109 -103 -94 -87 -75 -68 -60 -37 -486 -812
Effects on Revenues -63 -67 -78 -81 -88 -96 -104 -114 -124 -135 -377 -949
Effects on the Deficita -8 -42 -31 -22 -6 9 29 46 64 98 -108 137
Estimated Changes Without Macroeconomic Feedback
Estimated Budgetary Impact of Macroeconomic Feedback
Estimated Changes With Macroeconomic Feedback
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Table 2.
Estimate of the Direct Spending and Revenue Effects of Repealing the Affordable Care Act, 
Without Macroeconomic Feedback
Billions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: Positive numbers indicate increases in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate reductions in the deficit. 
CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program.
a. Includes spending for exchange grants to states and net spending and revenues for risk adjustment and reinsurance.
b. Includes the associated effects on revenues of changes in taxable compensation.
c. Consists mainly of the effects on revenues of changes in taxable compensation. CBO estimates that repealing the coverage provisions 
would reduce outlays for Social Security benefits by about $9 billion over the 2016–2025 period and would have negligible effects on 
outlays for other federal programs. 
d. These estimates reflect the effects of provisions affecting Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health programs, and they include the 
effects of interactions between insurance coverage provisions and those programs.
e. Off-budget effects include changes in Social Security spending and revenues as well as in spending by the U.S. Postal Service.
 Those gross savings would be partially offset by the 
effects of eliminating several ACA provisions related to 
insurance coverage that are projected to reduce federal 
deficits—including the provisions that impose 
penalties on some employers and uninsured people 
and that impose an excise tax on certain high-
premium insurance plans. In addition, increases in 
employment-based coverage stemming from a repeal 
would reduce revenues because most payments for that 
coverage are exempt from income and payroll taxes. In 
sum, those effects of repealing the ACA would increase 
federal deficits by $502 billion over the 2016–2025 
period, CBO and JCT estimate, and the net savings 
from repealing the ACA’s coverage provisions would 
thus be $1,156 billion. 







Exchange Subsidiesa -41 -69 -78 -82 -83 -86 -91 -94 -98 -101 -353 -822
Medicaid and CHIP Outlays -44 -66 -71 -75 -82 -88 -93 -97 -102 -106 -339 -824
Small-Employer Tax Creditsb -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -5 -11___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ____
Subtotal -86 -136 -150 -158 -166 -175 -184 -193 -201 -208 -697 -1,658
Penalty Payments by Uninsured People 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 19 43
Penalty Payments by Employersb 9 13 15 16 16 17 18 20 21 22 69 167
Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plansb 0 0 3 6 7 9 11 14 17 21 16 87
Other Effects on Revenues and Outlaysc 7 15 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 27 81 204___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ____
Subtotal 19 32 40 45 48 52 58 63 69 75 185 502
Net Decrease in the Deficit From
Repealing Coverage Provisions -67 -104 -110 -113 -118 -123 -127 -130 -132 -133 -512 -1,156
Increase in the Deficit From Changes in Outlaysd 24 35 46 61 77 91 111 125 140 168 243 879
Increase in the Deficit From Changes in Revenues 39 40 57 59 62 66 70 75 79 83 258 631
Net Effect on the Deficit -5 -28 -7 7 21 35 55 70 87 118 -12 353
On-budget -8 -34 -14 -1 13 26 45 59 75 104 -44 265
Off-budgete 3 6 7 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 32 88
Net Changes in the Deficit From Repealing Insurance Coverage Provisions
Net Increase in the Deficit From Repealing
Net Increase or Decrease (-) in the Deficit
Other Provisions Affecting Direct Spending and Revenues
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Figure 1.
Estimated Effects on Deficits of Repealing the Affordable Care Act
Billions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Note: The term “macroeconomic feedback” refers to the estimated effects on the federal budget that would arise from changes in 
economic output or other macroeconomic variables—such as changes in the number of hours that people work and in their aggregate 
compensation, which would change revenues, or changes in interest rates, which would change interest payments. 
 The ACA also includes many other provisions related 
to health care that are estimated to reduce net federal 
outlays, primarily for Medicare. The provisions with 
the largest effects reduced payments to hospitals, to 
other providers of care, and to private insurance plans 
delivering Medicare’s benefits, relative to what they 
would have been under prior law. Repealing all of 
those provisions would increase direct spending in the 
next decade by $879 billion, CBO estimates. 
 The ACA also includes many provisions that are 
estimated to increase federal revenues (apart from the 
effect of the provisions related to insurance coverage). 
Those with the most significant budgetary effects 
increased the Hospital Insurance payroll tax rate for 
high-income taxpayers, added a surtax on those 
taxpayers’ net investment income, and imposed 
annual fees on health insurers. JCT estimates that 
repealing all of those provisions would reduce 
revenues by a $631 billion over the 2016–2025 
period.
CBO and JCT also analyzed the macroeconomic effects 
of repealing the ACA and then estimated the impact of 
their feedback to the federal budget. According to the 
agencies’ estimates, repealing the ACA would increase 
GDP by about 0.7 percent in the 2021–2025 period, 
mostly because provisions of the law that are expected to 
reduce the supply of labor would be repealed. Over the 
next few years, however, repealing the ACA would have 
smaller estimated effects on output—partly because 
responses to a repeal would be expected to occur gradu-
ally and partly because the effects would be muted while 
the economy is operating below its potential (maximum 
sustainable) output. Over the 2016–2025 period, that 
macroeconomic feedback would reduce federal deficits by 
$216 billion, CBO and JCT estimate, largely because of 
the additional revenues attributable to the increases in the 
supply of labor (which would in turn increase employ-
ment and taxable income). 
All told, CBO and JCT estimate that repealing the ACA 
would raise federal deficits by $137 billion over the 2016–
2025 period through its impact on direct spending and on 
revenues. A repeal would reduce deficits during the first half 
of the decade but would increase them by steadily rising 
amounts from 2021 through 2025. Including the effects of 
macroeconomic feedback, a repeal of the ACA would 
increase the federal budget deficit by $9 billion in 2021, 
rising to $98 billion in 2025 (see Figure 1). 
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That growth in projected increases in deficits from 
repealing the ACA reflects the agencies’ estimates that, 
toward the end of the 10-year budget window, the net 
savings from repealing the law’s coverage provisions 
would increase more slowly than the net costs of repeal-
ing the act’s other provisions. Although many factors 
would affect the rate of growth of the savings from repeal-
ing the coverage provisions, one reason they would grow 
slowly is that the annual updates to exchange subsidies 
are structured in a way that slows their growth, which 
limits the savings from eliminating them; another is that 
the revenue loss from repealing the excise tax on certain 
high-premium insurance plans would grow very rapidly 
as more plans were affected each year. However, the reve-
nue losses and spending increases that would result from 
repealing the act’s other provisions would grow more rap-
idly than the net savings from repealing the coverage 
provisions. Most significantly, the costs of repealing the 
ACA’s reductions in updates to Medicare’s payment rates 
would compound over the next decade because those 
reductions lower the growth rate of Medicare’s costs. 
How Would a Repeal Affect the Budget and the 
Economy Beyond 2025? 
CBO and JCT expect that the trend projected for the lat-
ter part of the coming decade would probably continue 
after 2025, whether or not the effects of macroeconomic 
feedback are incorporated into the analysis. To generate 
rough estimates for the decade beyond 2025, CBO and 
JCT extrapolated the budgetary effects that a repeal of 
the ACA would have in the years before 2025. According 
to that analysis, and excluding the budgetary effects of 
macroeconomic feedback, a repeal would increase annual 
deficits over the 2026–2035 period by amounts that lie 
within a broad range around one percent of GDP. 
Although the macroeconomic feedback stemming from a 
repeal would continue to reduce deficits after 2025, the 
effects would shrink over time because the increase in 
government borrowing resulting from the larger budget 
deficits would reduce private investment and thus would 
partially offset the other positive effects that a repeal 
would have on economic growth. Consequently, taking 
that feedback into account would not substantially alter 
the increases estimated for federal deficits that would 
occur over that period. A repeal of the ACA would proba-
bly increase deficits in subsequent decades as well, 
whether or not the effects of macroeconomic feedback 
are included.
Why Are These Estimates Uncertain?
Estimates of the effects of repealing the ACA are subject 
to substantial uncertainty, which stems at least in part 
from the difficulty in projecting the effects of the ACA 
itself. Although initial data are available about some par-
ticular effects, the ways in which individuals, employers, 
states, insurers, doctors, hospitals, and other affected 
parties will respond to the changes made by the ACA—
and the ways in which those same people and organiza-
tions would respond to its repeal—are all difficult to pre-
dict, and the responses could deviate in either direction 
from CBO and JCT’s estimates. It also is a difficult 
task—and one subject to considerable uncertainty—to 
predict how repealing a law as complex as the ACA would 
be interpreted and implemented by executive branch 
agencies without some specific statutory guidance. 
The Supreme Court’s forthcoming ruling about subsidies 
provided through insurance exchanges constitutes 
another major source of uncertainty. CBO and JCT’s 
baseline projections and the estimates in this report 
reflect the way the law is currently being implemented, 
with subsidies available through all exchanges, but the 
Court could rule that the law does not authorize subsidies 
in some states. If that happened, CBO and JCT would 
reduce their projections of spending on those subsidies 
under current law and would reduce their estimates of the 
savings generated by repealing the ACA’s coverage provi-
sions—although the magnitude of those reductions is 
uncertain and would depend in part on the specific 
details of the Court’s opinion. 
Over the longer term, there is particular uncertainty 
about the ways that providers of health care will respond 
to the ACA’s reductions in the updates to Medicare’s 
payment rates and about whether repealing the ACA 
would weaken pressures for cost control that may have 
contributed to a broad slowdown in spending growth for 
health care. The effects on labor markets, GDP, and other 
macroeconomic variables—and the resulting budgetary 
feedback—also could be smaller or larger than the 
agencies have estimated. 
On balance, CBO and JCT estimate that the most likely 
outcome of repealing the ACA would be to increase bud-
get deficits over the 2016–2025 period, but that estimate 
is designed to represent the middle of a broad range of 
possible outcomes. In light of the myriad uncertainties 
involved, it is possible that repealing the ACA could 
6 BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REPEALING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT JUNE 2015
CBO
reduce deficits over that period or could increase them by 
substantially more than the agencies have estimated. 
Estimating the Effects of 
Repeal Legislation
Implementing a repeal of the ACA would present major 
challenges. In the five years since its enactment, nearly 
every key provision of the law has taken effect and has 
been incorporated into final rules and other administra-
tive actions. Undoing the ACA would thus be quite 
complicated. As a result, CBO and JCT’s budgetary and 
economic analyses have had to incorporate many assump-
tions about the ways in which legislation to repeal the 
ACA would be interpreted and implemented. For several 
reasons, the budgetary effects of a repeal would not simply 
be the opposite of the budgetary effects of the ACA itself.
Factors Affecting Implementation 
Although the proposals for repealing the ACA have varied 
slightly, they have shared many key elements. Generally, 
they have specified that the provisions of prior law would 
be “restored or revised as if such Act had not been 
enacted,” but they have not detailed how that would be 
accomplished.1 As a result, executive branch agencies 
would have considerable discretion in determining how to 
implement a repeal. Some proposals have specified that the 
repeal would be effective as of the original enactment date 
of the ACA, indicating that the revisions would be applied 
retroactively.2 Others have set effective dates in the future. 
For purposes of this analysis, CBO and JCT assumed that 
the repeal of the ACA would take effect on January 1, 
2016, and that it would not affect federal spending 
incurred or federal revenues collected in prior years. 
CBO and JCT cannot anticipate with any certainty what 
choices federal agencies would make to implement such 
legislation to repeal the ACA. Medicare, for example, 
would be affected in several fairly complicated ways. In 
many cases, the program’s payment rates reflect base pay-
ment amounts that are increased or updated each year 
according to formulas specified in law. The ACA reduced 
those updates, and repealing the relevant provisions 
would clearly cancel the reductions that are currently 
scheduled to take place in future years. The complication 
that arises is that the base payment amounts to which the 
updates will apply are currently lower than they would 
have been had the ACA never been enacted. If the ACA 
was repealed, it is unclear whether those base amounts 
would be adjusted upward so that future payments would 
not be affected by past update reductions. In other cases, 
repealing the ACA would require payment mechanisms 
for Medicare to revert to those used under prior law, but 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
would need to decide how to calculate those payments 
once the law was repealed. (Legislation to repeal the ACA 
could reduce the scope of such discretion, however, by 
specifying the manner of restoration or revival of the 
provisions of prior law.) 
How CBO and JCT Developed the Estimates 
The analysis presented in this report is based on the 
spending and revenue projections contained in CBO’s 
March 2015 baseline, as adjusted for subsequently 
enacted legislation (in particular, Public Law 114-10, 
the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 
2015).3 The estimates thus reflect all of the previous 
administrative actions, judicial decisions, and enacted 
legislation modifying the ACA’s provisions or affecting 
its implementation that were incorporated into that 
baseline. 
In some cases, provisions of the ACA have been super-
seded by subsequent legislation, so repealing those provi-
sions would not have a budgetary impact. For example, 
the ACA extended funding for the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) through 2015. However, 
P.L. 114-10 extended that funding through 2017, so 
repealing the ACA would not reverse the extension of 
CHIP that was enacted as part of the ACA. Similarly, 
P.L. 114-10 modified provisions governing the premiums 
that enrollees with higher income must pay for Part B of 
Medicare, superseding changes to those premiums made 
by the ACA. Several tax provisions that were enacted as 
1. For example, see H.R. 596, a bill to repeal the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act and health care-related provisions in the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, and for 
other purposes, 114th Cong. (2015), www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-bill/596.
2. For example, see H.R. 6079, Repeal of Obamacare Act, 112th 
Cong. (2012), www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/
6079. For a discussion of the challenges involved in repealing the 
ACA retroactively, see Congressional Budget Office, letter to the 
Honorable John Boehner providing an estimate for H.R. 6079, 
the Repeal of Obamacare Act (July 24, 2012), www.cbo.gov/
publication/43471. 
3. See Congressional Budget Office, Updated Budget Projections: 
2015 to 2025 (March 2015), www.cbo.gov/publication/49973, 
and cost estimate for H.R. 2, the Medicare Access and CHIP 
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (March 25, 2015), www.cbo.gov/
publication/50053. 
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part of the ACA also have been repealed or modified, 
thus reducing some of the revenue consequences of 
repealing the ACA.
Furthermore, CBO and JCT anticipate that some 
changes induced by the ACA would be sustained in the 
event of its repeal, at least for some period. For example, 
the ACA established deadlines that accelerated imple-
mentation of Medicare’s bidding program for durable 
medical equipment, and CBO expects that if the ACA 
was repealed, that program would not revert to the slower 
schedule anticipated under prior law. Similarly, some of 
the people projected to enroll in Medicaid as a result 
of the ACA were eligible for the program under prior law 
and thus would remain eligible in the event of a repeal; 
CBO and JCT estimate that rates of enrollment among 
those previously eligible people would remain elevated for 
a few years. Whether a repeal of the ACA would have 
broader effects on the rate of cost growth in health care—
beyond the effects already captured in CBO and JCT’s 
estimates—is discussed further below. 
Because the ACA was a large, complex piece of legisla-
tion, estimating the effects of its repeal also is compli-
cated, although the degree of difficulty varies somewhat 
depending on the provision. For example, estimating the 
effects of repealing the ACA’s insurance coverage provi-
sions is simplified by the fact that those provisions created 
many new flows of funds that CBO and JCT can distin-
guish and estimate separately from one another—in par-
ticular, the subsidies for insurance purchased through 
exchanges and federal payments for Medicaid beneficia-
ries made newly eligible by the law—in constructing 
baseline budget projections. In those cases, the effect of 
repeal can be readily estimated by reversing the signs 
of those amounts as projected in CBO’s baseline (with 
some adjustments, described elsewhere in this report). 
However, some of those provisions and many others in 
the ACA modified existing programs or existing tax law 
or affected other spending or revenues indirectly. Those 
budgetary effects are not projected separately in CBO’s 
baseline and must be newly estimated for each repeal pro-
posal, relative to current baseline projections of spending 
and revenues. For example, Medicare’s total payments to 
hospitals change from year to year for various reasons, 
and there is no identifiable stream of payments or savings 
that is specifically attributable to the ACA’s provisions—
so those savings must be estimated anew. The ACA 
includes dozens of such provisions that affect payments to 
different types of providers. Likewise, various provisions 
of the ACA governing revenues affect the ways that 
households and businesses arrange their finances and 
thus alter income or payroll tax revenues. However, the 
effects of the ACA on those continuing revenue streams 
cannot be easily identified and are not projected sepa-
rately, so they must be newly estimated in any analysis of 
repeal legislation. 
Differences From an Estimate of the 
ACA’s Effects Since Its Enactment
A related question that sometimes arises is whether CBO 
and JCT could provide an updated estimate of the ACA’s 
budgetary impact from its inception that would be simi-
lar to the analyses that the agencies provided when the 
law was enacted. A retrospective analysis of the effects of 
a current law is quite different from a cost estimate for 
proposed legislation because such an analysis requires the 
formulation of a counterfactual benchmark to represent 
what would have happened over the past few years if the 
law had not been enacted; that would be a challenging 
undertaking that is beyond the scope of CBO and JCT’s 
usual analytic methods. The agencies therefore cannot 
readily provide a retrospective analysis of the ACA that is 
analogous to the cost estimate that was provided in 2010. 
That problem is not unique to the ACA—it is common 
to most legislation that affects preexisting federal 
programs and taxes.4
Effects of a Repeal Over the 
Next 10 Years, Excluding 
Macroeconomic Feedback
To estimate the budgetary effects of the ACA’s repeal, 
CBO and JCT first examined the impact on health insur-
ance coverage and on the federal budget over the next 
decade, holding GDP and other macroeconomic vari-
ables constant—which is the only approach that the 
agencies take for most cost estimates. As with past analy-
ses of the ACA, the current budgetary analysis involved 
grouping the ACA’s provisions into two broad categories: 
The provisions concerning insurance coverage, including 
subsidies provided through the insurance exchanges, 
increased outlays for Medicaid, revenues from certain 
penalties and taxes, and related budgetary effects; and the 
various noncoverage provisions, mostly affecting direct 
4. For additional discussion, see Congressional Budget Office, 
answers to questions for the record following a hearing on the 
budget and economic outlook for 2014 to 2024 conducted by the 
Senate Committee on the Budget (June 10, 2014), pp. 14–19, 
www.cbo.gov/publication/45396. 
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spending for Medicare and making changes in the tax 
code that are not directly related to insurance coverage. 
Taking into account the effects on federal revenues and 
direct spending but excluding the budgetary effects of 
macroeconomic feedback, CBO and JCT estimate that a 
repeal of the ACA would increase federal deficits by 
$353 billion over the 2016–2025 period.5 That figure 
reflects an estimated reduction in outlays of $821 billion 
that is more than offset by an estimated reduction in rev-
enues of $1,174 billion. The resulting estimate of the 
effects on deficits is substantially larger than the one 
CBO and JCT issued in July 2012 for a similar proposal 
to repeal the ACA—a difference that mostly reflects a 
shift in the budget window to encompass later years in 
which repealing the ACA would increase budget deficits 
sharply. As with past analyses of the ACA, the estimates 
in this report do not include any savings or costs associ-
ated with changes in discretionary spending—even 
though future appropriations to administer the ACA’s 
provisions would no longer be needed if that law was 
repealed.6 
Effects on Insurance Coverage
A repeal of the ACA would include a repeal of various 
provisions that, under current law, are projected to 
increase the number of nonelderly people who have 
health insurance. Those provisions include an expansion 
of eligibility for Medicaid, subsidies for nongroup cover-
age purchased through health insurance exchanges, a 
requirement that most U.S. residents obtain insurance 
coverage or pay a penalty, and a penalty on certain 
employers that do not offer their full-time workers health 
insurance that meets specified standards for coverage 
and affordability. In addition, an excise tax on certain 
employment-based health plans with relatively high pre-
miums will take effect starting in 2018. The ACA also 
contains a range of provisions that affect the types and 
prices of insurance policies that can be sold. Those—and 
many other provisions affecting insurance coverage—also 
would be repealed. 
If the ACA was repealed, many people would obtain their 
coverage from a source that differs from current projec-
tions, and many others who are projected to retain or 
gain insurance coverage in the future would instead be 
uninsured (see Table 3). On average, over the 2021–2025 
period, the following changes would occur, relative to 
CBO and JCT’s current-law projections:  
 About 14 million fewer people would be enrolled in 
Medicaid. 
 About 18 million fewer people would have nongroup 
coverage. That reduction is the net effect of a 
projected decline of about 22 million in nongroup 
coverage purchased through exchanges (which would 
no longer serve as a conduit for federal subsidies and 
might not exist at all) and a projected increase of 
about 4 million enrollees in nongroup coverage 
purchased directly from insurers. 
 About 8 million more people, on net, would have 
employment-based coverage—roughly mirroring the 
agencies’ estimate of the extent to which the ACA will 
reduce employment-based coverage in future years. 
 About 24 million more nonelderly U.S. residents 
would be uninsured.7 
The effects on sources of insurance coverage in earlier 
years would generally be similar or slightly smaller, but 
the effects of repealing the ACA are estimated to be 
noticeably smaller in 2016—partly because the ACA is 
not projected to increase insurance coverage as much in 
that year. For reasons that are discussed below, the effects 
of repealing the ACA on people’s sources of insurance 
coverage differ slightly from the estimated effects of 
implementing the coverage provisions that are shown in 
the agencies’ most recent baseline projections. 
Effects on Direct Spending and Revenues 
Related to Insurance Coverage
CBO and JCT estimate that repealing the provisions of 
the ACA affecting health insurance coverage would yield 
a net decrease in federal deficits of $1,156 billion over 
5. Direct, or mandatory, spending is the budget authority provided by 
laws other than appropriation acts and the outlays that result from 
that budget authority. CBO and JCT estimate that on-budget 
deficits would increase by $265 billion over the 2016–2025 
period and that off-budget deficits would increase by $88 billion 
over that period. Off-budget effects include changes in Social 
Security spending and revenues as well as spending by the 
U.S. Postal Service. 
6. Discretionary spending is the budget authority provided and 
controlled by appropriation acts and the outlays that result from 
that budget authority.
7. As a result, the overall share of the nonelderly population with 
health insurance would drop from about 90 percent under current 
law to about 82 percent if the ACA was repealed. 
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Table 3.
Estimate of the Effects on Health Insurance Coverage of Repealing the Affordable Care Act 
Millions of Nonelderly People, by Calendar Year
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Notes: Estimates of the nonelderly population include residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia who are younger than 65.
ACA = Affordable Care Act; CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program.
a. Amounts reflect average annual enrollment over the course of a year and include spouses and dependents covered under family policies; 
people reporting multiple sources of coverage are assigned a primary source. Amounts represent CBO’s March 2015 baseline, adjusted for 
enactment of Public Law 114-10, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015.
b. “Other coverage” includes Medicare; the changes from repealing the ACA would be almost entirely for nongroup coverage. 
c. The change in employment-based coverage is the net result of projected increases and decreases in offers of health insurance from 
employers and changes in enrollment by workers and their families.
fiscal years 2016 through 2025 because of those provi-
sions’ effects on direct spending and revenues (see Table 2 
on page 3). That amount includes the following:
 A total of $822 billion in savings resulting from 
eliminating exchange subsidies, 
 A net reduction of $824 billion in federal outlays for 
Medicaid and CHIP, and 
 Additional savings totaling $11 billion from the repeal 
of a tax credit for certain small employers that provide 
health insurance to their employees.8
Those gross savings of $1,658 billion over the 2016–
2025 period would be partly offset by costs totaling 
$502 billion stemming from four sources related to 
insurance coverage: 
 A reduction in revenues of $43 billion from 
eliminating penalty payments by uninsured people, 
 A decline in revenues of $167 billion from eliminating 
penalty payments by employers, 
 A reduction in revenues of $87 billion from 
eliminating the excise tax on certain high-premium 
insurance plans, and
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Insurance Coverage Under Current Lawa
Insurance exchanges 20 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22 22
Medicaid and CHIP 51 52 52 52 53 53 54 54 54 55
Employment-based coverage 149 149 150 151 152 153 153 153 154 155
Nongroup and other coverageb 22 22 22 23 23 23 23 23 24 24
Uninsured 29 27 27 26 26 26 26 27 27 27___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Total 271 272 274 275 276 277 278 280 281 282
Change in Insurance Coverage With Repeal of the ACA
Insurance exchanges -20 -23 -23 -23 -23 -23 -23 -22 -22 -22
Medicaid and CHIP -8 -11 -11 -12 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14 -14
Employment-based coveragec 6 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Nongroup and other coverageb 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4
Uninsured 19 22 22 23 24 24 24 24 24 24
Number of Uninsured Nonelderly People With Repeal of the ACA 48 49 49 49 50 50 50 50 50 50
8. The ACA’s premium subsidies for health insurance purchased 
through exchanges are structured as refundable tax credits; CBO 
and JCT treat the portions of such credits that exceed taxpayers’ 
other income tax liabilities as outlays and the portions that reduce 
tax payments as reductions in revenues—just as other refundable 
tax credits are treated. Subsidies to reduce enrollees’ cost-sharing 
liabilities are classified as outlays. A small portion of the cost of the 
tax credit for certain small employers (and the savings that would 
arise from its repeal) reflects its effects on outlays. 
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 Other budgetary effects, mostly involving revenues, 
associated with shifts in the mix of taxable and 
nontaxable compensation resulting from net increases 
in employment-based health insurance coverage—
which would, on net, increase deficits by $204 billion.9
Those figures differ by about $51 billion from the esti-
mated effects of the ACA’s coverage provisions that are 
reflected in CBO’s March 2015 baseline, for three main 
reasons.10 First, the costs for exchange subsidies and addi-
tional Medicaid payments over the first three months of 
fiscal year 2016 will be incurred during calendar year 
2015 and thus would not be eliminated by a repeal 
(which, for the purposes of this analysis, is assumed to 
take effect on January 1, 2016). Second, for the next 
few years, some proportion of the people who have 
enrolled or are expected to enroll in Medicaid as a result 
of the ACA—and who would have been eligible even if 
the ACA had never been enacted—probably would still 
enroll in Medicaid if the ACA was repealed, and the sav-
ings attributable to the repeal would be reduced as a 
result. Third, enactment of P.L. 114-10 increased the 
projections of enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP, relative 
to the March 2015 baseline, and correspondingly reduced 
the costs of coverage obtained through exchanges and 
employment-based plans. On net, those changes also 
reduced the savings that would be generated by repealing 
the ACA. (Those factors largely explain why the esti-
mated effects that a repeal would have on the number of 
people with various types of insurance coverage differ 
slightly in magnitude from CBO and JCT’s baseline 
projections of the ACA’s effects.) 
Effects on Direct Spending for Medicare, 
Medicaid, and Other Programs
The ACA made numerous changes to payment rules and 
rates for Medicare and Medicaid, and it made other 
changes to certain other federal health programs as well. 
On net, CBO estimates, repealing those provisions would 
increase direct federal spending by $879 billion over the 
2016–2025 period, mostly because of changes in spending 
for Medicare, which would rise by an estimated 
$802 billion (see Table 4). Repealing the provisions of the 
ACA that are not related to insurance coverage would 
increase federal spending for Medicaid by about $66 bil-
lion over that period, mostly because of increases in 
payments for prescription drugs and payments to hospitals 
that treat a disproportionate share of uninsured or low-
income patients.11 On net, direct spending for other health 
programs would increase by about $10 billion, CBO esti-
mates. 
Nearly all of the net increase estimated for direct spend-
ing for Medicare—about $715 billion of the estimated 
$802 billion—would stem from repealing provisions of 
the ACA that imposed reductions in payment rates or 
slowed increases in payment rates (relative to prior law) 
for services covered under Parts A and B of Medicare; 
those benefits are provided either through the traditional 
fee-for-service sector of the Medicare program or through 
private insurance plans.12 (Those private plans are gener-
ally known as Medicare Advantage plans; they receive 
payments under Medicare’s Part C.) Roughly one-half of 
that net increase in spending would stem from repealing 
provisions that changed payment rates in the fee-for-
service sector; the other half would be attributable to 
repealing provisions that changed the rules for setting 
payment rates for Medicare Advantage plans.13 Because 
the ACA reduced the rate at which many payments are 
updated annually, the effects of those provisions on 
9. Changes in the extent of employment-based health insurance 
affect federal revenues because most payments for that coverage 
are exempt from income and payroll taxes. If employers increase 
or decrease the amount of nontaxable compensation they provide 
in the form of health insurance (relative to current-law 
projections), CBO and JCT estimate that offsetting changes will 
occur in wages and other forms of compensation—which 
generally are taxable—to hold total compensation roughly the 
same. Such effects also arise with respect to other provisions of law 
(such as the excise tax on certain high-premium insurance plans), 
and those effects are included in the estimates for those elements. 
10. See Congressional Budget Office, “Effects of the Affordable Care 
Act on Health Insurance Coverage—Baseline Projections” 
(March 2015), www.cbo.gov/publication/43900. 
11. In total, federal spending for Medicaid and CHIP would be 
reduced by $758 billion over the 2016–2025 period, combining 
the effects of repealing the provisions related to and those not 
related to insurance coverage. 
12. Medicare Part A covers inpatient services provided by hospitals, 
care in skilled nursing facilities, home health care, and hospice 
care. Part B mainly covers services provided by physicians, other 
practitioners, and hospitals’ outpatient departments.
13. Payments in the fee-for-service sector affect payments to Medicare 
Advantage plans, and changes in either of those types of payments 
affect the premiums that enrollees pay for Part B of Medicare. In 
previous estimates, CBO calculated the aggregate effects of those 
interactions separately, but now the agency incorporates those 
interactions into the estimates for each provision. As a result, the 
current estimates for the effects of repealing specific provisions of 
the ACA affecting Medicare are not comparable to previous 
estimates.
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Table 4.
Estimated Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues That Would Result From Repealing the 
Affordable Care Act, Without Macroeconomic Feedback
Billions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Note: CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program; * = between $0 and -$0.5 billion.
a. Represents the outlay portion of several coverage-related provisions, including small-employer tax credits, and associated effects of 
coverage provisions on outlays for Social Security benefits.
b. Off-budget effects include changes in Social Security spending and revenues as well as in spending by the U. S. Postal Service.
c. Amounts reflect repeal of fees on manufacturers and importers of branded drugs and on health insurance providers and repeal of an 
excise tax on manufacturers and importers of certain medical devices.
d. Positive numbers indicate increases in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate reductions in the deficit.








Exchange subsidies and state exchange grants -35 -59 -67 -71 -71 -74 -78 -82 -85 -89 -303 -712
Payments for risk adjustment and reinsurance -15 -17 -13 -15 -16 -16 -17 -17 -17 -16 -75 -158
Medicaid and CHIP -44 -66 -71 -75 -82 -88 -93 -97 -102 -106 -339 -824
Other changes in direct spendinga * * * -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -6__ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ____
Subtotal -94 -142 -152 -161 -170 -179 -189 -197 -205 -211 -720 -1,700
Other Provisions
Medicare provisions 23 34 44 58 69 82 100 113 126 153 228 802
Other Medicaid provisions 2 2 3 4 7 8 9 10 11 11 17 66
Other changes in direct spending -1 -1 -1 -1 1 2 2 3 3 4 -3 10__ __ __ __ __ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Subtotal 24 35 46 61 77 91 111 125 140 168 243 879
Total Outlays -71 -107 -106 -100 -93 -88 -77 -71 -65 -43 -477 -821
On-budget -70 -106 -105 -100 -92 -87 -76 -70 -64 -42 -474 -813
Off-budgetb * -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4 -9
Coverage Provisions
Exchange premium credits 6 10 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 48 109
Collections for risk adjustment and reinsurance -14 -16 -13 -15 -16 -16 -17 -17 -17 -16 -74 -157
Small-employer tax credits 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 10
Penalty payments by uninsured people -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -5 -5 -5 -5 -19 -43
Penalty payments by employers -9 -13 -15 -16 -16 -17 -18 -20 -21 -22 -69 -167
Excise tax on high-premium insurance plans 0 0 -3 -6 -7 -9 -11 -14 -17 -21 -16 -87
Other changes in revenues -7 -16 -19 -20 -21 -22 -24 -25 -27 -28 -83 -209__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ ___
Subtotal -27 -38 -42 -48 -52 -56 -62 -67 -73 -78 -208 -544
Other Provisions
High-income surtaxes -22 -17 -31 -33 -35 -37 -39 -42 -44 -47 -136 -346
Fees on certain manufacturers and insurersc -14 -18 -19 -18 -19 -20 -21 -22 -23 -23 -87 -196
Other revenue provisions -3 -6 -8 -8 -9 -10 -10 -11 -12 -13 -34 -89__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ ___
Subtotal -39 -40 -57 -59 -62 -66 -70 -75 -79 -83 -258 -631
Total Revenues -66 -79 -99 -107 -115 -123 -132 -142 -152 -161 -466 -1,174
On-budget -62 -72 -91 -99 -106 -113 -121 -130 -138 -146 -430 -1,078
Off-budgetb -4 -7 -8 -8 -9 -10 -11 -12 -13 -15 -36 -96
Net Effect on the Deficit -5 -28 -7 7 21 35 55 70 87 118 -12 353
On-budget -8 -34 -14 -1 13 26 45 59 75 104 -44 265
Off-budgetb 3 6 7 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 32 88
Changes in Outlays
Changes in Revenues
Net Increase or Decrease (-) in the Deficitd
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federal spending will compound over the next decade; as 
a consequence, the costs of repealing them would grow 
relatively rapidly. 
The ways in which HHS would implement a repeal of 
the ACA’s Medicare provisions governing payment 
updates are uncertain, however. For this analysis, CBO 
assumed that repealing the provisions that reduced pay-
ment updates in the fee-for-service sector would increase 
the payment updates in 2016 and beyond—but it also 
assumed that HHS would not adjust the current base 
payment amounts to remove the effects of past update 
reductions implemented under the ACA. If instead HHS 
also adjusted those base payment amounts upward for the 
purposes of determining future payments, the cost of 
repealing the ACA’s provisions would be roughly 
$160 billion higher over the 2016–2025 period than 
is estimated above. 
Effects on Discretionary Spending
The estimates discussed elsewhere in this report do not 
include any savings or costs associated with changes in dis-
cretionary spending. CBO’s original cost estimate for the 
ACA, issued in March 2010, focused on direct spending 
and revenues because those effects are relevant for budget-
ary procedures affecting Congressional debate and occur 
without any additional legislative action (as contrasted 
with discretionary spending, which is subject to future 
appropriation action). However, that estimate noted that 
additional funding would be necessary for agencies to carry 
out the responsibilities required of them by the legislation 
and that the legislation also included explicit authoriza-
tions for a variety of grants and other programs.14 
Repealing the ACA would reduce the amounts of future 
appropriations that are needed for implementation or 
that are specifically authorized in the act for other pur-
poses. (Some funds would be needed in 2016 to imple-
ment a repeal.)15 However, the impact of a repeal on total 
discretionary appropriations over the next several years 
would depend on future legislative actions. Moreover, the 
potential impact of such legislation on future appropria-
tions is affected by the caps on annual appropriations that 
were established by the Budget Control Act of 2011. 
Eliminating the need to implement the ACA might lead 
to reductions in total discretionary spending, on net, or it 
might create some room under those caps for additional 
spending for other discretionary programs. 
Effects on Revenues Not Related to Coverage
The ACA made many changes to the Internal Revenue 
Code that were not directly related to the law’s insurance 
coverage provisions. JCT estimates that repeal of those 
noncoverage revenue provisions would reduce revenues 
by a total of $631 billion over the 2016–2025 period (see 
Table 4). The largest components of those revenue effects 
include the following:
 The ACA increased the Hospital Insurance payroll 
tax for certain high-income taxpayers and applied a 
surtax to their net investment income. Repeal of those 
provisions is projected to reduce revenues by 
$346 billion. 
 Repeal of an annual fee on health insurance providers is 
estimated to reduce revenues, on net, by $142 billion 
(reflecting both the loss of fee collections and the 
indirect effects of those fees on health insurance 
premiums that are either tax-preferred or subsidized). 
 The repeal of an annual fee on manufacturers and 
importers of branded drugs is projected to reduce 
revenues by $30 billion, and the repeal of an excise tax 
on manufacturers and importers of certain medical 
devices is projected to reduce revenues by $24 billion. 
Comparison With a Prior Estimate
CBO and JCT’s current estimate that repealing the ACA 
would increase deficits by $353 billion over 10 years 
(excluding the effects of macroeconomic feedback) differs 
from the estimate that the agencies released in July 2012 
for H.R. 6079—the last time they analyzed a proposal to 
14. For more information, see Congressional Budget Office, cost 
estimate for H.R. 4872, the Reconciliation Act of 2010 (final 
health care legislation) (March 20, 2010), pp. 10–11, 
www.cbo.gov/publication/21351, letter to the Honorable Jerry 
Lewis about potential effects of H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, on discretionary spending (May 11, 
2010), www.cbo.gov/publication/21457, and “H.R. 3590, Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Additional Information on 
the Potential Discretionary Costs of Implementing PPACA” 
(May 12, 2010), www.cbo.gov/publication/21460. 
15. In 2012, CBO estimated that, over the 2013–2022 period, 
repealing the ACA would reduce the need for appropriations 
to the Internal Revenue Service by between $5 billion and 
$10 billion and would reduce the need for appropriations to 
HHS  by between $5 billion and $10 billion. CBO has not 
updated those estimates. 
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Figure 2.
Comparison of Estimated Effects on Deficits of Repealing the Affordable Care Act
Billions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The term “macroeconomic feedback” refers to the estimated effects on the federal budget that would arise from changes in 
economic output or other macroeconomic variables—such as changes in the number of hours that people work and in their aggregate 
compensation, which would change revenues, or changes in interest rates, which would change interest payments. 
June 2015 estimates were developed for this report; 2012 estimates are from Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable 
John Boehner providing an estimate for H.R. 6079, the Repeal of Obamacare Act (July 24, 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43471.
repeal all of the ACA’s provisions.16 At that time, CBO 
and JCT estimated that changes in direct spending and 
revenues would increase deficits by $109 billion over the 
period from 2013 through 2022. 
Most of the difference between that earlier estimate and 
the current one stems from a shift in the budget window 
to encompass later years—in which repealing the ACA is 
estimated to increase budget deficits sharply. In fact, over 
the 2016–2022 period, which is encompassed by both 
estimates, the estimated budgetary effects of repeal are 
quite similar (see Figure 2): In 2012, CBO and JCT esti-
mated that repealing the ACA would increase budget def-
icits by a total of $46 billion from 2016 through 2022; 
the agencies now estimate that repeal would boost deficits 
by $78 billion over that period (excluding the effects of 
macroeconomic feedback). In 2012, CBO and JCT esti-
mated that repealing the ACA would increase the deficit 
substantially in the decade after 2022, but they did 
not quantify the annual effects. CBO and JCT now esti-
mate that repealing the ACA would increase deficits by 
$275 billion over the 2023–2025 period. 
It is difficult to identify all of the specific reasons for the 
differences between the two estimates for the 2016–2022 
period because CBO and JCT have made many changes 
in their baseline projections since 2012 to account for 
such factors as changes in economic conditions and pro-
jections, technical changes and improvements in the 
agencies’ models, administrative actions, judicial deci-
sions, and statutory changes. One item of significance is 
that, since 2012, the agencies have substantially lowered 
their projections of per capita spending on health care. 
That change in particular has contributed importantly to 
substantial but offsetting changes in the estimated effects 
of repealing various components of the ACA: 
 Holding other factors equal, the changes in 
projections of per capita spending on health care have 
lowered the total cost for any given year of subsidizing 
coverage through the exchanges or Medicaid; 
correspondingly, the gross and net savings estimated to














16. The 2012 estimate was issued shortly after the Supreme Court 
ruling that made the ACA’s Medicaid expansion optional for 
states. See Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable 
John Boehner providing an estimate for H.R. 6079, the Repeal of 
Obamacare Act (July 24, 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/
43471. 
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Figure 3.
Evolution of CBO and JCT’s Estimates of the Net Budgetary Effects of the 
Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act
Billions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: Effects on the deficit of provisions of the Affordable Care Act that are not related to insurance coverage and effects on discretionary 
spending are not shown. 
Estimates for the various years are from Congressional Budget Office, “Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance 
Coverage—Baseline Projections” (March 2015), “Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act—CBO’s April 2014 
Baseline” (April 2014), “May 2013 Baseline” (May 2013) www.cbo.gov/publication/43900, and cost estimate for H.R. 4872, the 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (final health care legislation) (March 20, 2010), www.cbo.gov/publication/21351.
result from repealing the ACA’s insurance coverage 
provisions are smaller. Many other factors also have 
affected the agencies’ projections since 2012, includ-
ing reductions in the number of people projected to 
purchase coverage through exchanges and increases 
in the number of people projected to obtain coverage 
through Medicaid—but the net effect has been a 
reduction in the projected costs of the coverage 
provisions (see Figure 3). Taking into account all 
of those factors, the net savings from repealing the 
coverage provisions are now projected to total 
$762 billion over the 2016–2022 period, as compared 
with $1,027 billion in the previous estimate (a 
26 percent reduction). 
 At the same time, lower projections of spending on 
health care are reflected in lower projections of outlays 
for Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care 
programs—and thus in lower estimated costs in any 
given year from repealing the ACA provisions that 
reduced those outlays. Taking into account those and 
other factors, and again focusing on the 2016–2022 
period covered by both estimates, the net costs of 
repealing those provisions are now projected to total 
$445 billion, as compared with $623 billion in the 
previous estimate (a 28 percent reduction).
 The increase in deficits that stems from repealing the 
noncoverage revenue provisions is now projected to 
total $394 billion over the 2016–2022 period, as 
compared with $450 billion in the previous estimate 
(a 12 percent reduction). Changes to the overall 
macroeconomic forecast, additional data, and changes 
to the tax code that have occurred since 2012 have 
resulted in revisions to estimates of the effects of 
repealing several of those revenue provisions. The 
projections of an overall reduction in health spending 
also have affected the estimates for several of those 
provisions, thus contributing to a smaller estimate for 
costs that would be attributable to a repeal.
In sum, CBO and JCT now estimate that repealing the 
insurance coverage provisions of the ACA would generate 
$762 billion in net savings over the 2016–2022 period, 
an amount that would be offset by $840 billion in esti-
mated costs from repealing the other provisions, to yield a 
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net increase in deficits of $78 billion over that period. In 
2012, the estimate of $1,027 billion in net savings from 
repealing the ACA’s coverage provisions was offset by 
$1,073 billion in estimated costs from repealing the other 
provisions—yielding an estimated net increase in deficits 
of $46 billion for the 2016–2022 period. 
The Macroeconomic Feedback Effects 
of a Repeal and Their Impact on the 
Federal Budget
CBO and JCT also have analyzed the effects that repeal-
ing the ACA would have on the U.S. economy and esti-
mated the budgetary impact—or feedback effects—of 
those macroeconomic changes. CBO and JCT estimate 
that the net effect on the economy’s output would be 
negligible in 2016 but would grow after that. According 
to the agencies’ estimates, from 2021 through 2025, a 
repeal would increase GDP by about 0.7 percent, on 
average—mostly by repealing provisions that, under 
current law, are expected to reduce the supply of labor. 
The macroeconomic feedback effects of repealing the 
ACA would lower federal deficits by $216 billion over the 
2016–2025 period, CBO and JCT estimate (see Table 1 
on page 2). The largest effect would be an increase in rev-
enues arising from the increased supply of labor, which in 
turn would boost employment and taxable income. After 
accounting for the feedback effects, CBO and JCT esti-
mate that the total impact on direct spending and reve-
nues of repealing the ACA would be to increase federal 
deficits by $137 billion over the 2016–2025 period. 
The estimates of the macroeconomic effects and of their 
consequences for the federal budget are highly uncertain, 
however, and actual results could be substantially different. 
In general, CBO and JCT analyze the macroeconomic 
effects of changes in fiscal policy by examining similar 
policies that have been implemented previously and by 
using results from a variety of economic models. Both 
agencies also distinguish between longer- and shorter-
term effects. Changes in fiscal policy affect output over 
the longer term by altering people’s incentives to work 
and save and by changing businesses’ incentives to invest, 
thereby changing potential output over the longer term. 
In the shorter term, changes in fiscal policies also can 
affect the economy by influencing the demand for goods 
and services, leading to changes in actual output relative 
to potential output (the maximum sustainable output of 
the economy). 
For this report, CBO and JCT collaborated to examine 
the macroeconomic effects of repealing the ACA and 
those effects’ feedback to the federal budget, with each 
agency focusing on different components of the analysis. 
JCT primarily analyzed the macroeconomic effects and 
feedback to federal revenues stemming from the revenue 
provisions not related to insurance coverage and from the 
excise tax on certain high-premium insurance plans.17 
CBO primarily analyzed the macroeconomic effects and 
feedback to federal revenues arising from the other 
changes in fiscal policy that would stem from repealing 
the ACA, as well as the feedback effects to federal outlays 
stemming from a repeal.18 The estimates of macro-
economic effects and of their feedback to the federal 
budget presented in this report constitute a synthesis of 
those analyses.
Macroeconomic Effects from 2021 Through 2025
The largest macroeconomic effects of repealing the ACA 
would take several years to arise. CBO and JCT estimate 
that, over the final five years of the current budget win-
dow—the period from 2021 to 2025—repealing the 
ACA would boost GDP by about 0.7 percent, on average, 
relative to current-law projections. During that period, 
the estimated effects on output stem from two main 
sources: 
17. JCT used its macroeconomic equilibrium growth (MEG) model, 
in which economic output in the longer run is determined by the 
supply of labor and capital, which in turn respond to the rates of 
taxation on wages and capital income. In the shorter run, output 
may be influenced by changes in consumer demand stemming 
from changes in after-tax income. For a description, see Joint 
Committee on Taxation, Overview of the Work of the Staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation to Model the Macroeconomic Effects of 
Proposed Tax Legislation to Comply with House Rule XIII.3.(h)(2), 
JCX-105-03 (December 2003), http://go.usa.gov/3XS2R. For a 
discussion of the values currently used in the MEG model, see 
Joint Committee on Taxation, Macroeconomic Analysis of the 
“Tax Reform Act of 2014,” JCX-22-14 (February 2014), 
http://go.usa.gov/3XSTJ. 
18. To estimate the effects of repealing the ACA over the longer term, 
CBO employed a version of a widely used Solow-type growth 
model in which economic output is determined by the number of 
hours of labor that workers supply, the size and composition of 
the capital stock (such as factories and equipment), and the 
combined productivity of labor and capital (known as total factor 
productivity). In the short term, changes in fiscal policies also can 
affect the economy by influencing the demand for goods and 
services by consumers, businesses, and governments, which leads 
to changes in actual output relative to potential output. For a 
description see Congressional Budget Office, How CBO Analyzes 
the Effects of Changes in Federal Fiscal Policies on the Economy 
(November 2014), www.cbo.gov/publication/49494. 
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 The ACA’s largest effects on output are projected to 
result from several provisions that reduce the supply of 
labor by decreasing some people’s incentives to work; 
repealing those provisions would thus increase the 
supply of labor and increase output relative to baseline 
projections. 
 Implementation of the ACA is also expected to shrink 
the capital stock, on net, over the next decade, so a 
repeal would increase the capital stock and output over 
that period. In particular, repealing the ACA would 
increase incentives for capital investment, both by 
increasing labor supply (which makes capital more 
productive) and by reducing tax rates on capital 
income. However, the net increase in deficits that 
would be caused by a repeal—even after accounting for 
macroeconomic feedback—would increase government 
borrowing and thus would reduce capital investment 
somewhat in the longer term. 
Labor Supply. CBO and JCT estimate that repealing the 
ACA would increase the supply of labor and thus increase 
aggregate compensation (wages, salaries, and fringe bene-
fits) by an amount between 0.8 percent and 0.9 percent 
over the 2021–2025 period. Those effects would be the 
result of repealing various provisions of the ACA that are 
estimated to reduce the amount of labor that people 
choose to supply. In particular, the subsidies and tax 
credits for health insurance that the ACA provides to 
some people are phased out as their income rises—creat-
ing an implicit tax on additional earnings—and those 
subsidies, along with expanded eligibility for Medicaid, 
generally make it easier for some people to work less or to 
stop working without losing health insurance coverage.19 
For other people, the act directly imposes higher taxes on 
labor income, thus discouraging work. Repealing the 
ACA would reverse those effects. In percentage terms, the 
increase in total hours worked is estimated to be larger 
than the increase in aggregate compensation because the 
largest increases in labor supply would occur among 
the lower-wage workers whose incentives would be most 
strongly affected. Specifically, repealing the ACA would 
increase the aggregate number of hours worked by about 
1.5 percent over the 2021–2025 period, CBO and JCT 
estimate. 
CBO previously estimated that implementation of the 
ACA will have larger effects on hours worked and com-
pensation.20 To update that analysis for this estimate, 
CBO and JCT first considered the agencies’ most recent 
baseline projections of the number of people affected by 
the ACA’s provisions—including projections of enroll-
ment in subsidized exchange plans and in Medicaid. The 
agencies also considered more recent evidence about 
the ACA’s likely effects on labor markets and extended 
that analysis to 2025. As a result, the estimated effects of 
the ACA on total hours worked and compensation in the 
second half of the 10-year budget window were reduced 
by about 15 percent, mostly because fewer people are 
now projected to receive subsidies through exchanges 
under current law. 
Capital Stock. CBO and JCT estimate that repealing the 
ACA would increase the capital stock over the 2021–
2025 period, on net, for two main reasons. First, the pro-
jected reduction in labor supply stemming from the ACA 
is expected to cause a gradual reduction in the capital 
stock as businesses adjust the amount of capital available 
for workers to use—so repealing the ACA would undo 
that effect. Second, repealing the ACA also would elimi-
nate several taxes that reduce people’s incentives to save 
and invest—most notably the 3.8 percent tax on various 
forms of investment income for higher-income individu-
als and families. The resulting increase in the incentive to 
save and invest—relative to current law—thus would 
gradually boost the capital stock; consequently, output 
would be higher. 
CBO and JCT also considered the extent to which 
repealing the ACA would affect output through its effects 
on federal deficits. As discussed in more detail below, the 
agencies estimate that repealing the act ultimately would 
increase federal deficits—even after accounting for other 
macroeconomic feedback. Larger deficits would leave less 
money for private investment (a process sometimes called 
crowding out), which reduces output. Over the 2021–
2025 period, however, that effect would not be large 
enough to offset the effects of repealing the ACA that 
would boost investment. 
19. Because such people would still be insured, CBO and JCT 
estimate that the changes in labor supply stemming from repeal of 
the ACA would not significantly affect the number of people who 
had health insurance, although the changes would affect the 
sources of health insurance for some people. 
20. CBO had estimated that the ACA will cause a reduction of 
roughly 1 percent in aggregate labor compensation over the 2017–
2024 period and will reduce the total number of hours worked, on 
net, by 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent during that period. See 
Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 
2014 to 2024 (February 2014), Appendix C, www.cbo.gov/
publication/45010. 
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CBO and JCT thus estimate that, on balance, repealing 
the ACA would yield a larger capital stock, which would 
boost output over that period. The effects on output of 
those changes in the capital stock would be smaller than 
the increases in output stemming from changes in the 
supply of labor. 
Macroeconomic Effects From 2016 Through 2020 
CBO and JCT estimate that repealing the ACA would 
have smaller effects on output in the next few years than 
would occur later in the coming decade, in part because 
the ACA’s adverse effects on output are projected to be 
smaller as the responses to its provisions phase in. Corre-
spondingly, repealing the law would have smaller effects 
over the 2016–2020 period. The macroeconomic effects 
of implementing or repealing the ACA also are different 
when the economy operates below its potential, as is 
projected for the next two years or so. CBO and JCT 
estimate that a repeal would have a negligible effect on 
output in 2016 and would increase output by about 
0.1 percent in 2017, rising to about 0.6 percent in 2020. 
Labor Supply. One reason that the effects of repealing the 
ACA would be smaller over the next few years is that 
the law’s influence on labor supply will probably be 
smaller over that period. That conclusion reflects an 
expectation that the number of people who will receive 
exchange subsidies under the ACA will be somewhat 
smaller next year than in later years. The number of addi-
tional Medicaid enrollees also is projected to rise over the 
next several years under current law. Moreover, people 
will probably adjust gradually to the incentives under 
current law, and CBO and JCT estimate that affected 
people would probably adjust gradually to a repeal of the 
ACA as well. Consequently, the estimated effects on labor 
supply over the shorter term—both for current law and 
for a repeal of the ACA—are smaller. 
A second consideration is that the reductions in labor 
supply stemming from the ACA are expected to have a 
somewhat muted effect on total hours worked over the 
next two years or so, when there will still be some slack in 
the labor market. Thus, if some workers reduce the num-
ber of hours they work or leave the labor force altogether, 
some underemployed workers or people who are not 
actively looking for employment but are willing to work 
will probably be available to take their place. As a result, 
the ACA’s effects on labor markets are projected to be 
smaller in the near term—so the effects of repealing the 
ACA also would be smaller.
Aggregate Demand. CBO and JCT estimate that repeal-
ing the ACA would decrease aggregate demand for goods 
and services in the short-term—reversing the projected 
effects of the ACA and slightly dampening output over 
the next two years or so. On balance, implementation of 
the ACA is expected to boost overall demand because the 
people who will benefit from the expansion of Medicaid 
or from access to the exchange subsidies are predomi-
nantly in lower-income households and thus are likely to 
spend a large fraction of their additional resources on 
goods and services—whereas the people who will pay 
higher taxes are predominantly in higher-income house-
holds and are likely to change their spending to a lesser 
degree. Similarly, reduced Medicare payments to hospi-
tals and other providers under the provisions of the ACA 
will reduce income and profits, but those changes are 
likely to decrease demand by a relatively small amount. 
Given the projected effects of the ACA in spurring 
demand and output to a small degree over the next few 
years, CBO and JCT estimate, repealing the ACA would 
have the opposite effect. 
Combined Short-Term Effects on Output. On balance, 
CBO and JCT estimate, the reduction in aggregate 
demand in 2016 that would stem from repeal of the 
ACA would roughly offset the rise in output caused 
by increases in labor supply and by the other factors 
described above, so projected output would be about the 
same in 2016 whether or not the law was repealed. Out-
put would be higher, on net, in later years because the 
dampening effect on aggregate demand would wane 
and the other effects of repealing the ACA that boost 
output would strengthen—particularly the effects on 
labor supply. 
Budgetary Feedback From Macroeconomic Effects 
Taking into account the factors described above, CBO 
and JCT estimate that the macroeconomic effects of 
repealing the ACA would lower federal deficits by 
$216 billion over the 2016–2025 period. Most of that 
reduction would stem from an increase in revenues result-
ing from higher employment and taxable income, relative 
to projections under current law. Combined with the 
estimated effects of a repeal on federal deficits excluding 
macroeconomic feedback, the total result of changes in 
direct spending and revenues would amount to an 
increase in federal deficits of $137 billion over 10 years. 
CBO and JCT’s estimates of those macroeconomic feed-
back effects and the methods used to generate them 
depend in part on the types of provisions and categories 
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of feedback being analyzed. In estimating the feedback 
effects on revenues of repealing the noncoverage revenue 
provisions and the excise tax on certain high-premium 
insurance plans, JCT projected macroeconomic effects and 
net effective tax rates for several different types of taxable 
income (including wages, interest, dividends, capital gains, 
and business income). In analyzing the coverage provi-
sions—which affect the economy primarily through their 
impact on labor supply—CBO estimated that the resulting 
increases in GDP would raise revenues in a roughly pro-
portional way, primarily because income and payroll taxes 
would rise with higher compensation and income. 
To estimate the effects of macroeconomic feedback on 
federal spending, CBO generally uses a simplified 
method that accounts for changes in GDP and interest 
rates, among other factors, but does not involve the sort 
of detailed program-by-program analysis that the agency 
uses for official cost estimates. As a rule, increases in GDP 
would have much smaller effects on federal spending 
than on revenues. CBO’s estimates for discretionary 
programs incorporate the assumption that spending 
generally remains at the amounts projected in its budget-
ary baseline even if output changes.21 For mandatory 
programs, CBO estimates, aggregate spending would be 
affected only slightly by a change in the rate of economic 
growth.22 
The agencies’ analysis of macroeconomic effects on the 
federal budget includes effects on interest payments 
caused by changes in interest rates. In 2016 and 2017, 
the reduction in overall demand estimated in the event of 
a repeal of the ACA would slightly reduce interest rates 
and, as a result, federal interest payments. Over the lon-
ger term, however, repealing the ACA would be expected 
to increase interest rates slightly—by roughly 5 basis 
points, or five one-hundredths of a percent—because of 
the resulting increase in federal borrowing. Under current 
law, federal debt held by the public (on which interest 
payments are made) is projected to be about $14 trillion 
in 2016 and about $21 trillion in 2025, so even small 
changes in interest rates can have a noticeable effect on 
interest payments as that debt is refinanced.23 
Overall, CBO and JCT estimate, the macroeconomic 
effects of repealing the ACA would increase federal reve-
nues much more than they would affect federal outlays. 
Specifically, the increase in output that would result from 
repealing the ACA would boost revenues by $225 billion 
over the 2016–2025 period.24 By 2021, when the increase 
in output attributable to the legislation is estimated to 
reach 0.7 percent, the macroeconomic effects would 
boost federal revenues by nearly the same percentage—
or by about $27 billion. (Under current law, federal reve-
nues are projected to total about $4.2 trillion in 2021.) 
In subsequent years, however, the feedback to federal 
revenues would shrink slightly as a share of total revenues 
because of the macroeconomic effects of the projected 
increases in federal borrowing. Outlays would primarily 
be affected by the estimated changes in interest rates, fall-
ing initially and then rising slightly in later years. On net, 
CBO estimates, the macroeconomic effects of repealing 
the ACA would increase outlays by $9 billion over the 
2016–2025 period.
Other Potential Effects on Output 
Implementation of the ACA—and consequently, its 
repeal—could affect GDP and other aspects of the econ-
omy in several other ways. In CBO and JCT’s judgment, 
however, those other effects generally would be small 
and probably would offset one another. For example, 
increases in insurance coverage stemming from the ACA 
could improve workers’ health or their job matches, 
which could in turn make them more productive. In that 
case, repealing the law would have the opposite effect. 
The evidence about such effects is limited, however. One 
recent study also found that past extensions of Medicaid 
21. Changes in projected prices and rates of inflation affect CBO’s 
projections of discretionary spending. CBO estimates that if the 
ACA was repealed, those macroeconomic effects would be small, 
resulting in an estimated reduction in discretionary spending of 
less than a billion dollars over the next decade.
22. For GDP growth, CBO recently estimated that a reduction in the 
real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate of 0.1 percentage point per 
year over the next decade—which would reduce GDP by about 
1 percent in 2025—would reduce mandatory spending only by 
$4 billion over that period. According to that rule of thumb, a 
corresponding increase in the rate of GDP growth over the next 
decade would be expected to increase mandatory spending by 
roughly the same amount. See Congressional Budget Office, The 
Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2025 (January 2015), 
Appendix C, www.cbo.gov/publication/49892. 
23. Reflecting a long-standing convention, CBO does not include in 
cost estimates the budgetary effects of changes in interest 
payments stemming from changes in the amount of debt 
incurred. However, the macroeconomic effects of those changes in 
interest payments are incorporated into the agency’s 
macroeconomic analysis. 
24. A portion of the $225 billion increase in revenues would come 
from increases in payments of Social Security payroll taxes, which 
are off-budget, but CBO cannot provide an estimate of that 
portion at this time. 
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eligibility for children increased their earnings and tax 
payments as adults.25 However, the ACA did not 
substantially change the number of children eligible for 
Medicaid, so that finding is not directly relevant to an 
analysis of the ACA or its repeal. 
At the same time, repealing the ACA could increase 
productivity through other channels. For example, pro-
ductivity could fall, under current law, if businesses hired 
more part-time workers and fewer full-time workers as a 
way to avoid paying the penalties that the ACA imposes 
on larger businesses that do not offer health insurance to 
their full-time employees. In addition, businesses might 
invest less in their workers’ training because workers will 
find it easier than they did under prior law to change jobs 
without losing health insurance, and the resulting higher 
turnover reduces the return on such investments. Repeal-
ing the ACA could thus reverse those effects, but in any 
event such effects would probably be small. 
A repeal of the ACA also could affect saving rates by 
encouraging people to save more of their income to cover 
the expected costs of health care, which would in turn 
lower interest rates and boost output. Such effects would 
probably be small, however, and could be offset by the 
reinstatement of certain prior-law tests for Medicaid 
eligibility. Those tests limited the amount of assets that 
certain people could hold and still qualify for Medicaid, 
and reinstating those limits would, to a small degree, 
discourage savings.
Impact on the Economy and the 
Federal Budget Beyond 2025
Detailed, year-by-year projections of the effects of a 
repeal in years beyond 2025 would not be meaningful 
because the uncertainties involved are simply too great. 
Instead, CBO and JCT have made a rough assessment 
of the likely budgetary consequences in the decade 
after 2025 of repealing the ACA, with and without the 
effects of macroeconomic feedback. Both types of analy-
sis indicate that repealing the act would increase deficits 
over the 2026–2035 period, and it seems likely that such 
legislation would result in higher budget deficits in later 
years as well. 
Effects Excluding Macroeconomic Feedback
To assess budgetary effects in the decade after 2025, CBO 
and JCT grouped the elements of the estimate into broad 
categories, examining their rates of growth towards the 
end of the 10-year budget window, and projecting the 
rate at which the budgetary impact of each category 
would increase over time—as the agencies did during 
consideration of the ACA and similar legislation in 2009 
and 2010, and when preparing their 2012 estimate of the 
effects of a repeal. Overall, CBO and JCT estimate that 
the direct spending and revenue effects of repealing the 
ACA would increase the federal deficit by $55 billion in 
2022 and by amounts that would rise to $118 billion in 
2025 (excluding the effects of macroeconomic feedback). 
For this analysis, the effects were grouped as follows:
 Net savings from repealing the ACA’s coverage 
provisions would total $133 billion in 2025, and 
CBO and JCT estimate that the savings would be 
growing by about 2 percent per year toward the end of 
the 10-year budget window. That estimate of slow 
growth reflects several factors, but one reason those 
savings would grow relatively slowly in that period 
(and in later years) is that the annual updates to 
exchange subsidies are structured in a way that will 
tend to slow their growth—which would limit the 
savings from a repeal.26 Another reason is that 
the revenues stemming from the excise tax on certain 
high-premium insurance plans will grow rapidly as 
more plans are affected by that tax, and the loss of 
those revenues would reduce the net savings from 
repealing the coverage provisions. 
 Repealing changes that the ACA made to Medicare, 
Medicaid, and other federal health programs—other 
than those associated directly with expanded insurance 
coverage—would cost a total of $168 billion in 2025, 
and CBO estimates that those costs would be growing 
by about 15 percent per year toward the end of the 
10-year budget window. That rapid growth would 
occur because repealing the ACA’s reductions in 
updates to Medicare’s payment rates would increase 
the growth rate of that program’s spending, and thus 
the costs of repealing those provisions would 
compound over the next decade.
25. David W. Brown, Amanda E. Kowalski, and Ithai Z. Lurie, 
Medicaid as an Investment in Children: What is the Long-Term 
Impact on Tax Receipts? Working Paper 20835 (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, January 2015), www.nber.org/papers/
w20835. 
26. For additional discussion of the provisions that govern the annual 
updates for exchange subsidies, see Congressional Budget Office, 
The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlook (June 2015), pp. 33–34, 
www.cbo.gov/publication/50250. 
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 Repealing the ACA’s revenue provisions that are not 
related to insurance coverage would result in revenue 
losses totaling $83 billion in 2025, and JCT estimates 
that those losses would be growing by about 6 percent 
per year toward the end of the 10-year budget 
window. 
Extrapolating the budgetary effects for each category 
using the growth rates described above yields an estimate 
that repealing the ACA would continue to increase 
federal deficits substantially in subsequent years. In par-
ticular, CBO and JCT conclude that repealing the ACA 
would increase federal budget deficits over the 2026–
2035 period, relative to the deficits that would occur 
under current law, by amounts that lie within a broad 
range around one percent of GDP. The imprecision of 
that calculation reflects the greater degree of uncertainty 
surrounding it relative to CBO and JCT’s 10-year 
estimates. 
Effects Including Macroeconomic Feedback
The same macroeconomic effects that would generate 
budgetary feedback over the 2016–2025 period also 
would operate farther into the future. However, the net 
savings stemming from those effects would start to 
decline after 2019, CBO and JCT estimate, and would 
continue to shrink after 2025. Although the increase in 
labor supply would continue to boost output and reve-
nues in a roughly proportional way, the growing increases 
in federal deficits that are projected to occur if the ACA 
was repealed would increasingly crowd out private invest-
ment and boost interest rates. Both of those develop-
ments would reduce private investment and thus would 
dampen economic growth and revenues; the increase 
in interest rates also would increase federal interest 
payments. 
On balance, output would probably be higher over the 
2026–2035 period as a result of repeal, but incorporating 
the budgetary effects of macroeconomic feedback would 
not substantially alter the estimated increase in federal defi-
cits over that period—which would remain within a broad 
range around one percent of GDP. Including the effects of 
macroeconomic feedback, a repeal of the ACA would 
probably increase deficits in subsequent years as well. 
Uncertainty Surrounding the Estimates 
Although CBO and JCT have endeavored to develop 
estimates that are in the middle of the distribution of 
potential outcomes, that distribution spans a wide range. 
Estimates of the budgetary impact of repealing the ACA 
are based in large part on projections of the law’s effects, 
which are themselves highly uncertain. Assessing the 
effects of broad changes made by the ACA in the nation’s 
health care and health insurance systems requires esti-
mates of a broad array of technical, behavioral, and eco-
nomic factors that are difficult to predict. For example, 
the effects of the ACA on insurance coverage depend on 
how individuals, employers, and insurers respond to the 
subsidies and penalties and related changes instituted by 
the act. Uncertainty about those factors translates into 
still more uncertainty regarding the budgetary effects of 
repealing the act’s insurance coverage provisions.27
As for the other provisions of the ACA, separating their 
incremental effects on outlays for continuing programs 
and existing revenue streams from other factors that affect 
those outlays and revenues can become more difficult and 
uncertain over time because more of those other factors 
may arise. The substantial discretion that would be 
given to executive branch agencies to determine how to 
implement a repeal of the ACA is yet another source of 
uncertainty. 
Several other sources of uncertainty stand out: the 
Supreme Court’s forthcoming ruling on exchange subsi-
dies; the responses of providers over the longer term to 
the ACA’s reductions in Medicare’s payment updates; the 
degree to which the recent slowdown in overall spending 
on health care will persist, and the nature of the ACA’s 
role in that slowdown; and the law’s macroeconomic 
effects, particularly concerning labor markets. 
The Supreme Court’s Ruling 
Currently, a particular source of uncertainty involves the 
outcome of litigation regarding whether people may 
receive subsidies for coverage purchased through 
exchanges that are operated by the federal government 
rather than by a state government. The Supreme Court is 
expected to rule on that case later in June 2015. Until that 
27. One area of uncertainty involves the extent to which employers 
will continue to offer health insurance coverage to their workers 
under current law. However, CBO and JCT’s analysis found that 
even if the changes in employment-based health insurance 
differed substantially from those projected, they would have 
limited effects on the budgetary impact of the ACA because 
changes in the availability and take-up of such insurance affect 
the federal budget in several ways that are partly offsetting. See 
Congressional Budget Office, “The Effects of the Affordable Care 
Act on Employment-Based Health Insurance,” CBO Blog 
(March 15, 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43090. 
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ruling is issued, CBO and JCT’s baseline projections reflect 
the way the ACA is currently implemented, which involves 
people in many states receiving subsidies through what are 
known as federally facilitated marketplaces or through 
exchanges established in partnership between the federal 
government and a state government. In the event that the 
Supreme Court ruled that those subsidies must cease, 
CBO and JCT would reduce their projections of spending 
under current law and would reduce their estimates of the 
savings generated by repealing the ACA’s coverage provi-
sions. The magnitude of such changes would depend on 
the specifics of the Court’s ruling. If instead the Court 
ruled that the exchange subsidies are being issued properly, 
CBO and JCT’s baseline projections—and the estimates 
contained in this report—would not be affected by the 
Court’s ruling. 
Providers’ Responses to Changes in Payment Rates 
An important source of uncertainty in projecting 
health care spending under current law for the long 
term involves the way that providers will respond to 
scheduled restraint in annual updates to Medicare’s pay-
ment rates—and whether those responses will lead to 
offsetting increases or further reductions in spending for 
Medicare and other health care programs. The sched-
uled updates in the payment rates would generally fall 
below increases in the prices of inputs (namely, labor and 
supplies) used to deliver care. To keep the growth of their 
costs in line with the growth in those payment rates, pro-
viders could use fewer inputs per patient over time—that 
is, they could raise their productivity—or seek to control 
costs in other ways. If providers cannot achieve signifi-
cant gains in productivity, they might reduce the quality 
of care offered to Medicare enrollees, reduce enrollees’ 
access to care (which might reduce spending), or seek to 
increase revenues by other means (which might increase 
spending).28 The nature of such responses, if any, under 
current law would also affect the budgetary consequences 
of repealing the ACA. 
Trends in Health Care Spending 
Substantial uncertainty also surrounds the question of 
whether repealing the ACA would affect spending for 
health care in ways that are not captured directly in the 
estimates presented above. Health care spending has grown 
more slowly in recent years than it has historically, both in 
absolute terms and relative to the pace of economic 
growth. But that slow growth might not persist under 
current law. Although many analysts attribute at least a 
portion of the slowdown to the effects of the recent reces-
sion and slow recovery, there is debate about the role of 
structural or other changes in the health sector and 
whether and how enactment of the ACA has encouraged 
those changes. Some considerations suggest that the 
effect of the ACA’s enactment may be limited: 
 CBO’s own analyses and other studies have shown 
that Medicare spending began to slow before the 
enactment of the ACA—and before the recession—
and CBO also found that the direct effects of the 
recession explained very little of that slowdown, 
suggesting that other factors were at work.29 
 The overall slowdown in the growth of spending 
occurred when very few of the ACA’s provisions had 
been implemented in any substantial way, making it 
difficult to attribute much of the slowdown to the 
effects of specific provisions of that law. 
 At a more qualitative level, the last time health care 
spending grew at roughly the same rate as the 
economy for an extended period was in the mid- to 
late-1990s—after an unsuccessful attempt to enact 
major health care legislation—which suggests that 
attention to the issue rather than enactment of 
legislation could be an important factor. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to dismiss the argument that 
implementation of the ACA’s provisions has in some way 
fostered a focus on cost control that has encouraged 
slower growth in spending. As one analysis concluded 
recently, however, “it is impossible to quantify how much 
the ACA has truly contributed to the reduced spending 
projections over time”—at least until more extensive data 
and analyses are available.30 Reflecting that view, CBO 
28. For additional discussion, see Congressional Budget Office, 
The 2015 Long-Term Budget Outlook (June 2015), pp. 38–40, 
www.cbo.gov/publication/50250. 
29. See Michael Levine and Melinda Buntin, Why Has Growth in 
Spending for Fee-for-Service Medicare Slowed? Working Paper 
2013-06 (Congressional Budget Office, August 2013), 
www.cbo.gov/publication/44513; and Chapin White and Paul 
Ginsburg, “Slower Growth in Medicare Spending—Is This the 
New Normal?” New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 366, no. 12 
(March 22, 2012), pp. 1073–1075, www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMp1201853. 
30. See John Holahan and Stacey McMorrow, The Widespread 
Slowdown in Health Spending Growth: Implications for Future 
Spending Projections and the Cost of the Affordable Care Act 
(Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and Urban Institute, 
April 2015), p. 11, http://tinyurl.com/q7j6kkc. 
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and JCT have not incorporated such an effect into this 
estimate. But to the extent that such an effect has 
occurred and would continue under current law, repeal-
ing the ACA would generate a larger increase in federal 
deficits than is estimated here. Specifically, repealing the 
ACA would cause spending on Medicare and Medicaid to 
grow more rapidly—and the substantial costs of the tax 
preference for employment-based health insurance to 
grow more quickly—than is reflected in this estimate. 
Responses in Labor Markets 
Finally, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding CBO 
and JCT’s estimates of the macroeconomic effects of 
repealing the ACA, largely because of the uncertainty con-
cerning the consequences of that law for labor markets. 
That uncertainty arises in part because many of the ACA’s 
provisions have been in place for less than two years and in 
part because estimates of how workers and businesses 
might respond vary considerably. CBO and JCT seek to 
provide estimates of macroeconomic effects that lie in the 
middle of the distribution of potential outcomes, but the 
actual effects of the ACA could differ notably from their 
estimates. For example, if fewer people obtain subsidized 
insurance coverage through exchanges under the ACA 
than CBO and JCT expect—or if those people respond 
less strongly to incentives regarding work than the agen-
cies have estimated—then the effects of the ACA on 
employment and output would be smaller than estimated 
in this report (the same would be true for the cost of 
those subsidies). Alternatively, if more people obtain 
subsidized coverage through exchanges, or if the subsidy 
system affects their labor supply more strongly, then the 
ACA’s impact on the labor market and the economy (and 
the cost of subsidies) would be larger. The effects of 
repealing the ACA could thus be smaller or larger as well. 
Overall Magnitude of the Uncertainty 
Quantifying the variation in budgetary effects that might 
stem from any source of uncertainty is difficult, and 
trying to capture the likely effects for all of them simulta-
neously would be harder still. As a qualitative matter, 
however, the range of important uncertainties and the 
large flows of funds that are affected by the ACA suggest 
that the variation in budgetary effects of repealing that 
law could be substantial. Although CBO and JCT’s best 
estimate is that repealing the ACA would increase federal 
budget deficits by $137 billion over the 2016–2025 
period through its effects on direct spending and reve-
nues, the effects on federal deficits of repealing the ACA 
could differ, in either direction, from the central esti-
mates presented in this report by a sum that exceeds that 
amount. Thus, the uncertainty is sufficiently great that 
repealing the ACA could in fact reduce deficits over that 
period—or could increase deficits by a substantially larger 
margin than the agencies have estimated. 
For the decade after 2025, the estimated effects on defi-
cits of repealing the ACA are so large as to make it sub-
stantially less likely that a repeal could reduce deficits. 
The range of uncertainty grows wider over time, however, 
because it becomes more and more difficult to project 
health care spending—a key driver of both the costs and 
the savings generated by the ACA. Over a long horizon, a 
wide range of changes could occur in people’s health, in 
the sources and extent of their insurance coverage, and 
in the delivery of medical care (reflecting factors such as 
advances in medical research, developments in technol-
ogy, and changes in patterns of medical practice) that are 
likely to be significant but that are very difficult to pre-
dict, both under current law and under any proposal to 
repeal the ACA. 
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